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Objective: Electronic medical records (EMRs) data is increasingly incorporated into genome–phenome
association studies. Investigators hope to share data, but there are concerns it may be ‘‘re-identiﬁed’’
through the exploitation of various features, such as combinations of standardized clinical codes. Formal
anonymization algorithms (e.g., k-anonymization) can prevent such violations, but prior studies suggest
that the size of the population available for anonymization may inﬂuence the utility of the resulting data.
We systematically investigate this issue using a large-scale biorepository and EMR system through which
we evaluate the ability of researchers to learn from anonymized data for genome–phenome association
studies under various conditions.
Methods: We use a k-anonymization strategy to simulate a data protection process (on data sets contain-
ing clinical codes) for resources of similar size to those found at nine academic medical institutions
within the United States. Following the protection process, we replicate an existing genome–phenome
association study and compare the discoveries using the protected data and the original data through
the correlation (r2) of the p-values of association signiﬁcance.
Results: Our investigation shows that anonymizing an entire dataset with respect to the population from
which it is derived yields signiﬁcantly more utility than small study-speciﬁc datasets anonymized unto
themselves. When evaluated using the correlation of genome–phenome association strengths on
anonymized data versus original data, all nine simulated sites, results from largest-scale anonymizations
(population  100;000) retained better utility to those on smaller sizes (population  6000—75;000). We
observed a general trend of increasing r2 for larger data set sizes: r2 ¼ 0:9481 for small-sized datasets,
r2 ¼ 0:9493 for moderately-sized datasets, r2 ¼ 0:9934 for large-sized datasets.
Conclusions: This research implies that regardless of the overall size of an institution’s data, there may be
signiﬁcant beneﬁts to anonymization of the entire EMR, even if the institution is planning on releasing
only data about a speciﬁc cohort of patients.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Large-scale genotype–phenotype association studies have
rapidly increased in prevalence, due to a combination of massively
high-throughput technologies [1], lower cost computing platforms,
and systems that make information more widely available (e.g., the
Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP) [2]). At the same
time, it has been shown that data residing in electronic medical
records (EMRs) can enable such studies [3–6] ﬁnding, for instance,associations with atrioventricular conduction [7], white [8] and red
[9] blood cell traits, hypothyroidism [10], and, more recently, the
study of pharmacogenetic traits, including clopidogrel-response
[11] and warfarin dose [12]. This is further notable because there
are indications that learned associations can enable more effective
and safe healthcare [13], with early gains in drug dosing [14].
Given the increased reliance upon EMRs for big data research
projects, it is important for institutions to work towards data shar-
ing strategies [15–17]. Beyond adhering to policy requirements
[18], data sharing can support a wide range of activities [19],
including validation of published ﬁndings and discovery of novel
associations [20]. Despite the opportunities that biomedical data
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implications [21,22].
As part of a data protection plan, it is often suggested that bio-
medical data be disseminated in a manner, such that it is ‘‘de-iden-
tiﬁed’’ or devoid of explicit identiﬁers (e.g., personal names)
[18,23]. Over the past decade a growing list of investigations have
called into question the extent to which de-identiﬁcation can guard
research participants engaged in genomic studies from unsanc-
tioned ‘‘re-identiﬁcation’’ due to the very act of releasing genomic
information itself [24–28]. While we admit that this is an area of
concern [29], the likelihood that such attacks will be realized in
practice is currently unknown. Thus, in this work, we focus upon
linkage risks posed by information that, at the present moment, is
more likely to be exploited in re-identiﬁcation attacks [30].
For years, it has been known that certain commondemographics,
such as date of birth, gender, and 5-digit ZIP code, could be exploited
to discern an individual’s identity [31–34]. And, even when demo-
graphics are appropriately protected, it may be possible to exploit
other features, such as standardized clinical information. This is a
concern because it has been illustrated that the set of insurance bill-
ing codes (e.g., International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD)) in a
patient’s record are often unique [35]. And, while the abstraction
of billing codes (e.g., changing of a code representing that a patient
suffered from malignant neoplasm of thyroid gland (code 193) to
that of neoplasm (codes 140–249)) can drastically reduce the iden-
tiﬁability of patients within a genome–phenome association stud-
ies, it can also have a detrimental impact on the underlying data.
Ref. [36] proposed a method of clinical code anonymization that
yielded data appropriate for validation of reported ﬁndings. How-
ever, the attack scenario invoked in that work assumed that an
adversaryhas an almost-complete knowledge of the sample popula-
tion that is being published (e.g., which individuals in a population
were included in the study). While possible, the strength of this
attacker may not be reasonable, such that instead, in a scenario
where the institution publishing the data has a higher level of (but
not complete) trust in the systemand recipients of data,we consider
a modiﬁed attacker with a more limited set of knowledge.
An initial examination of the ability to protect clinical data (in
regards to re-identiﬁability) was provided in [37]. In that work,
the effects of protection were examined at three naturally-
occurring levels within a large academic healthcare system: (1)
all patients in the EMR systems, (2) all patients with specimens
in a biorepository (a subset of the EMR), and (3) a cohort of patients
whose DNA and EMRs were studied to validate certain genotype–
phenotype associations (a subset of the biorepository). In these
scenarios, the attacker was an individual with knowledge of a
patient’s visit to the healthcare institution, and their goal was to
identify the patient within the published data. It was observed that
by protecting a study’s cohort with respect to the entire group of
patients within the system, the disclosed data could support the
discovery of ﬁndings with signiﬁcance that exactly match those
of the association observed in the original system.
These ﬁndings suggested such a protection method is viable,
but the study was limited because it was evaluated in a speciﬁc
setting. In particular, it was not clear how these ﬁndings might
translate to other institutions. For instance, at the time of this
study, the biobank of the Vanderbilt University Medical Center
(VUMC), contained on the order of 110,000 specimens; yet other
institutions involved in the Electronic Medical Records and
Genomics (eMERGE) network have considerably smaller biorepos-
itories than VUMC which has approximately 110,000 records in its
biorepository1 (e.g., Northwestern University has approximately1 These values correspond to the size of the biorepositories at the end of the ﬁrst
phase of the eMERGE network in 2011.15,000 records, and the Mayo Clinic has approximately 20,000).
Additionally, other repositories aim for a signiﬁcant larger popula-
tion, such as UK Biobank, which plans on over 500,000 participants
[38].
Thus, in this paper, we examine the issue that other institutions
may face when confronted with the prospect of sharing data –
namely, that their overall EMR and biorepository may not be the
same size or bias (as regards composition of patients in the
biorepository versus in the more general hospital population) as
was investigated in [37]. For example, two institutions may be
developing a biorepository of a similar size. If, however, Institution
A targets their development toward a speciﬁc phenotype (e.g., con-
gestive heart failure) while Institution B develops a general-use
repository, these biobanks will have different biases (e.g., the rate
of appearance for ICD codes representative of CHF will be signiﬁ-
cantly greater in the former) and potentially even different repos-
itory sizes.
To perform this investigation, we conduct a large-scale sensitiv-
ity analysis between privacy (that is, ‘‘Can an individual patient be
re-identiﬁed from published data?’’) and utility (‘‘Is the data usable
in various genome–phenome association studies?’’). We examine
how anonymizing different quantities of electronic medical record
data and biorepositories (from small groups of 1000 individuals up
to a biorepository of 100,000 individuals and an EMR of over
1,000,000 individuals) affects the results of genome–phenome
associations after application of a formal data anonymization
algorithm.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in
Section 2, we discuss the relevant background to the anonymiza-
tion approach. In Section 3, we review the anonymization
algorithm, describe the experimental process, and detail the mea-
sures by which we analyze the algorithm. In Section 4, we high-
light the results of the experiments and provide insight into their
implications. In Section 5, we provide some intuition into the lar-
ger implications of this work and potential future directions of
study.
2. Background
2.1. Data privacy and policy
The protection of data derived from EMRs for release happens at
multiple levels (e.g., federal law, state law, and institutional
policies). Within the United States, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides de-identiﬁcation
speciﬁcations at the federal level [39]. These guidelines seek to
prevent the unique identiﬁcation of individuals in published data
(i.e., identity disclosure). The HIPAA Privacy Rule offers two alter-
native approaches to achieve de-identiﬁcation: (1) Safe Harbor
and (2) Expert Determination. When using the Safe Harbor policy,
all explicit identiﬁers (e.g., patient names, Social Security numbers,
and medical record numbers) are completely removed and
quasi-identiﬁers (or QIDs) are either removed or abstracted to
more general concepts. However, residual information contained
within Safe Harbor-compliant data may be exploited by the users,
provided they have sufﬁcient background knowledge. For example,
as alluded to earlier, it has been shown that even a few visits’
worth of ICD-9 codes uniquely identify individuals within an
EMR system in [35]. Given such vulnerabilities, it has been sug-
gested that more attention should be paid to the second method
for de-identiﬁcation [40]. In Expert Determination, data is said to
be de-identiﬁed, when an expert deems that there is ‘‘very small’’
risk that the anticipated recipient of the data could uniquely iden-
tify the corresponding individual from which the data was derived.
Here, we focus on a method of data protection within the Expert
Determination scope.
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Regulation does not say precisely what methods should be used
to ensure very small risk, but a variety of techniques have been
developed to mitigate risk when publishing data [41,42]. A ﬁrst
class corresponds to methods which inject noise into the disclosed
records. One increasingly popular method along these lines is dif-
ferential privacy [43]. This class of solutions focuses on the addi-
tion of a ‘‘small’’ amount of noise into a data set, within strict
statistically-proven bounds. While differential privacy is a popular
topic, the randomization has, in practice, made investigators hesi-
tant to adopt it for wide-spread usage, particularly when the data
is of high-dimensionality [44,45]. Moreover, differential privacy
requires that the difference in relevant statistics be calculated prior
to release of data, so that the released data is guaranteed to have
results that are ‘‘close’’ to the original. With data sharing, however,
all secondary studies may not be known at the time of study, which
makes this technique difﬁcult to apply in practice at this time.
With speciﬁc regards to differentially-private association stud-
ies, [46] has indicated that it may be possible to obtain reliable
association results through differentially-private genomics (e.g., a
genome-wide association study (GWAS) using single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) which have been protected according to
the deﬁnition of differential privacy [47]) in some situations. How-
ever, there are still several problems with this method of protec-
tion, including that a limited number of results may be returned.
There is also a low-likelihood possibility that the returned results
will be noisy (e.g., they implicate the wrong chromosome or the
wrong region of the chromosome).2.3. k-Type models
A second class, upon which our protection method is based, cor-
responds to k-type techniques. The most studied version of this
technique is k-anonymization [48], which has been applied to
the medical domain speciﬁcally [49]. k-anonymization requires
equivalence classes – that is, groups of records which share the
same values over a set of attributes (e.g., 5-digit ZIP codes and birth
dates) – to have at least k members. To ensure that the principle of
k-anonymity is met, many transformation strategies have been
introduced [50] The most popular data transformation strategy
to achieve k-anonymity involves the use of generalization and sup-
pression. k-anonymization is, itself, known to be vulnerable to var-
ious methods of attacks [51,52]. These attacks, however, generally
involve a separate style of attack model from identity disclosure
called attribute disclosure. That is, even if a dataset is k-anony-
mous, information about those attributes could leak and thus vio-
late those privacy guarantees. While this may be a matter of
general concern and research, current regulation only addresses
the issue of identiﬁability.
There have also been several investigations in the area of set-
valued anonymization. Traditionally an attribute could consist of
only one value – such as one’s birth date. Yet quasi-identiﬁers
can consist of attributes which have variable-length ﬁelds, such
as the set of diagnosis codes resulting from a hospital visit. Ref.
[53] discusses the nature of the problem, as well as provides an
optimal solution (under restricted conditions) which is inefﬁcient
in its run-time, as well as several greedy solutions to approximate
the optimal. This work, however, does not include the concept of
separate ‘‘visits’’ as a means to protection as we utilize in our
threat models, and thus is an incomplete solution for this domain.
Ref. [54] extended this work to adopt a heuristic to search for a rea-
sonable approach for anonymization of set-valued data. Their
approach, however, can result in a reduction in speciﬁcity of clin-
ical codes which could hinder genome–phenome analysis.These anonymization approaches operate under the assump-
tion that the speciﬁc records to be published will be extracted
and then anonymized. However, medical institutions have an
additional option. If they want to release the data on a cohort
of patients, say from a drug trial or a genome–phenome associa-
tion, they can protect that cohort against a larger population of
individuals who visited the hospital and from which the cohort
was selected (e.g., hospital population or biorepository). Notice
that when the smaller set, in this example the cohort, is
extracted, we no longer guarantee that k records will be equiva-
lent in the published data. Rather, we now refer the protection
back to the larger population using a model called k-map [48].
In this scenario, while a data recipient looking at the released
data may identify a unique individual within that release, there
are at least k 1 identical people within the broader population,
and the recipient does not know exactly which one we chose
from the population to reveal.
The speciﬁc method of anonymization for clinical codes was
described in detail in [37], to which we refer the reader for details
of the process. Here, our goal is to further understand what this
k-map anonymization can offer in terms of protection and data
usability to other institutions who release data.3. Methods
Fig. 1 shows an example of the general changes that structured
data in an EMR can undergo prior to release. At the left of the
ﬁgure, we show the initial data set with a medical record number
(MRN), patient name, date of admission, and resulting diagnosis. In
the middle of the ﬁgure, the data has been de-identiﬁed according
to an arbitrary policy. We assume that this process is performed
independently from the anonymization, and the input data set
for our algorithm is similar to what is shown here, because we note
that even if data is de-identiﬁed according to demographics, there
is still the possibility that a patient can be re-identiﬁed through
their clinical codes [35]. The anonymization process results in a
table similar to what is shown at the right of Fig. 1. Note that this
is an example of a 2-anonymous solution, and uses the process
described in [37].
Generally, the anonymization algorithm uses a single-visit
security model. In this model, it is assumed that an attacker has full
knowledge of a single patient visit (including the related ICD-9 bill-
ing codes). This means that we aim to prevent the attacker from
gaining any further knowledge about the patient, such as other
diagnosis codes or the genomic data associated with the entire
set of diagnosis codes. This is accomplished through a process of
generalizing codes which have a frequency below k times within
the data set to obtain a more general code that has enough support
to merit safe release.
This generalization means that some speciﬁcity in diagnosis
codes will be lost. The extent to which this happens is controlled
by expert knowledge. Here, expert knowledge is represented as a
hierarchy, which is used to guide the anonymization by speciﬁcally
allowing groups of codes to be generalized together. Through this
restriction, we can prohibit codes such as 733.0 (osteoporosis)
and 296.2 (Major depression, single episode) from being general-
ized together.
We use the anonymization process to enforce the following
requirements: (1) for any visit, as deﬁned by a group of ICD-9 codes
generated by some event, at least k 1 other records must have all
of these codes across any number of visits; (2) codes which do not
have sufﬁcient support to be released (e.g., occur in 6 k records)
can be generalized with another code that also has insufﬁcient
support to be released; (3) codes which still do not have sufﬁcient
frequency to be released and have no remaining codes with which
Fig. 1. An example of EMR data transformation for protection prior to publication. Angle-brackets (‘‘h; i’’) denote diagnosis generalized codes.
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dataset).
An example of the generalization process can be seen in the
third section of Fig. 1. Notice that codes 511.15 and 544.32 have
been generalized to the code h511.15,544.32i (which corresponds
to 511.15 and/or 544.32). Also note that code 105.33 occurs only
once in the data, and has no codes with which to generalize, and
is thus suppressed.
To validate the data obtained from the anonymization, we use
the phenome-wide association study (PheWAS) method in [55].
In a PheWAS, a statistical analysis is performed across a group of
phenotypes – perhaps represented by ICD-9 billing codes [4] – in
order to ﬁnd potentially linked genetic associations with a speciﬁc
region of the genome, such as a speciﬁc single nucleotide polymor-
phism (SNP).3.1. Experimental data
To show the potential of our anonymization, we use the VUMC
Synthetic Derivative (SD) [5] as an exemplar. The SD is a
de-identiﬁed version of the Vanderbilt EMR which is restricted to
Vanderbilt employees’ use for research purposes. The data set,
at the time of experimentation, included 1,366,786 unique patient
IDs. Of these records, biospecimens were also available for 104,904
patients. This set is referred to as BioVU. Of the records in BioVU,
5994 comprise a cohort used to demonstrate known genome–
phenome associations [55]. For reference, this set is referred to
as Demo.Fig. 2. An illustration of the process by which data is selected for the experiments.
03.2. Experimental design
We assume that an institution needs to release the data used in
a PheWAS. This institution has the following data sets: (1) Demo
(D): the cohort which is going to be released. (2) BioRepo (B): the
institution’s biorepository. Since the underlying study is a
genome–phenome association, it follows that D  B. Furthermore,
B0 ¼ B n D.2 Finally, (3) the institution’s full EMR (E). In this case,
B  E and it further follows that E0 ¼ E n B. Note that this automati-
cally excludes members of D from E0.
To simulate data of a given size and the results of the anonymi-
zation process, we randomly select records from the corresponding
VUMC dataset to build E at various sizes. These randomly selected
records comprise our simulated data for each institution. For
instance, to model an institution with a biorepository of 500
patients and an EMR of 5000 patients, we would select 500 records
from BioVU and an additional 5000 from the SD. These sizes will
represent the growth of the EMR as an institution increases its size
and thus, the protective ability of its data. We make the observa-
tion that in a k-type protection model, the ﬁdelity of the resulting
dataset, as represented by the total number of generalizations
required to release it, is linked with the frequency with which each
code appears within the original dataset.2 This notation refers to set exclusion, and means B0 is the biorepository (B)
excluding all members of D.The general process of this selection is shown in Fig. 2. But, in
general, suppose that jEj ¼ 15;000 records. D is required to be a
subset of this data set, and in this case jB0 [ E0j ¼ 9006 records.
Now, suppose that the institution’s biorepository has an additional
1000 records (i.e., jB0j ¼ 1000) and their EMR has the remainder
(i.e., jE0j ¼ 8006). To model this scenario, we begin with D and
add 1000 randomly selected records from BioVU. Next, we add
8006 randomly selected records from the SD, which comprise the
entirety of E. Note that we speciﬁcally prevent overlap in record
selection. Without this exclusion, a random selection could choose
a record within D during selection for B or E, such that we have
fewer records in the resulting anonymization than intended.
As mentioned previously, we assume that E has been de-identi-
ﬁed, and the ICD-9 codes are anonymized with k ¼ 5. Now, we
select the records in D, which have also been anonymized.
Following this selection, we replicate the PheWAS [55] with the
goal of measuring how much the anonymization process has chan-
ged the p-values associated with each SNP-phenotype pair. It is
worth noting here that the described PheWAS is a validation of
six genome–phenome association studies, and has results for six
speciﬁc, independent SNPs: (1) rs1333049, (2) rs2200733, (3)
rs2476601, (4) rs3135388, (5) rs6457620, and (6) rs17234657.
We then compare the results to the expected, original version of
D – that is, the results as initially reported.
To orient the reader, in Fig. 3, we show a QQ-plot indicating the
change in p-values for anonymization, based on results in [37]. The
x-axis corresponds to the original, non-anonymized p-value for
SNPs. The y-axis corresponds to the p-value subsequent to anony-
mization of only the Demo cohort. The basis line indicates how far
from the expected value a speciﬁc SNP’s association was
determined to be.Here, the Demo (D) cohort is mixed with jB j randomly selected records from the
biorepository (BioVU) to build a simulated protecting population (B). This group is
further protected by mixing in jE0 j randomly selected records from the electronic
medical records (SD) system to build a larger simulated protecting population (E).
Fig. 3. QQ-plot showing the difference in anonymized versus original Demo dataset
for rs6457620. The r2 of the linear regression (with the y-intercept forced to 0) is
0.90.
Table 1
Sizes of represented biobanks [3].
Simulated site Sizea ID
Boston Children’s Hospital 3372 B
GroupHealth Cooperative of Puget Sound 5859 G
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital 8472 C
Northwestern University Medical Center 12,000 N
Marshﬁeld Clinic 20,000 M
Mount Sinai School of Medicine 25,000 S
Geisinger Health System 35,000b G=M
Mayo Clinic 36,000b G=M
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphiac 60,000 CH o P I
100,000 CH o P E
Vanderbilt University Medical Center 110,000 –
a Note that the sizes of biorepositories may have grown since the beginning of
this study.
b The Geisinger Clinic and the Mayo Clinic have a similar number of biospecimens
which, in our analysis, are representative of the same result (i.e., G=M).
c CH o P has two separate biorepositories – Internal (I) and External (E).
Number of Records in Addition to Demo
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Fig. 4. r2 for PheWAS baseline with all records pulled from EMR (no additional
biobank (rs1333049)).
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resulting analyses, we report the summarized values for this
change (interested readers can ﬁnd the values in the original report
at [55]). The large number of these datasets, makes it infeasible to
show all relevant graphs or data (e.g., individual p-values) within
this manuscript. Instead, we report the information within these
graphs as the r2 of the correlation between the anonymized and
non-anonymized versions of the data. In this case, an r2 of 1
indicates a perfect match between the two data sets; i.e., when
all p-values were exactly equal. An r2 of 0 indicates that there
was no correlation between the two sets, and reliable results
would not be obtained. The r2 for Fig. 3 is 0.90.
Additionally, for each result, we show the slope of the remain-
ing points for the division (the speciﬁc point at which we change
from patients from a biorepository to those from the general
EMR). For example, if a data set has 50,000 records from BioVU,
we show the r2 for the 50,000 point, but also show what happened
when building up to that 50,000 (i.e., 1000 then 2000 and so forth)
and what happens if the group of 50,000 is supplemented with
additional EMR records (i.e., 50,000, then 70,000 and so forth).
We provide an indication of the trend of these results by showing
the slope of the regression line for these segments. Here, mL repre-
sents the slope of the former (i.e., sets of less than 50,000 records
from BioVU) while mR represents the slope of the latter (i.e., sup-
plementing the 50,000 records from BioVU with additional SD
records).
We highlight datasets that represent the known sizes of those
managed by members of the eMERGE network, as described in
[3]. We have reprinted the site identiﬁer and biobank size in Table 1
for these institutions. We show the r2 for each of these sets, as well
as those with additional EMR data, by using the biorepository size
as a split point. In the left of the relevant graphs, all records are
from BioVU (without the records in Demo); on the right, all records
are from the SD (without the records in BioVU).
For our experiments, we assume that the biobank size repre-
sents the number of additional samples against which a publish-
able sample can be protected. For instance, Boston Children’s
Hospital will have a total of approximately 9000 specimens in
our example; 6000 from the Demonstration group and the addi-
tional 3000. Further, for notational purposes, we assign each site
an experiment ID which we use to refer to the randomly-generated
set which corresponds to a dataset of the related size. Due to the
similar size of their datasets, Geisinger and Mayo are represented
by the same dataset, referred to as G=M.
Additionally, CH o P reports two separately-obtained bioreposi-
tories: Internal and External. Their Internal biorepository refers tothose biospecimens they have obtained directly, while their Exter-
nal biorepository refers to those obtained through collaborations
with other institutions [3].4. Experiments and results
In this section, we begin by discussing the results found within
one speciﬁc SNP (rs1333049) for each of the simulated sites. Fol-
lowing that, we present some general comments regarding our
ﬁndings for the remainder of the SNPs.4.1. rs1333049
We begin by highlighting the results of Fig. 4, where there is no
additional biobank against which to protect the participants in the
PheWAS. Here, we see that the initial accuracy of the PheWAS (as
reported by the r2) is approximately 0.92, and that, while adding
additional records from the EMR varies the resulting accuracy,
the general bound is [0.89,0.93].
Table 2
Summary of PheWAS accuracy (indicated as r2) following anonymization for site-
synthetic data sets. Base represents the expected results with all patients of the
biobank used for anonymization. Min and Max show the range for when additional
patients from the EMR (not in biorepository) are added. Graph indicates which graph
in Fig. 5 is represented.
Site Graph Base Min. Max
Demo Fig. 4 0.92 0.89 0.93
B Fig. 5a 0.94 0.93 0.95
G Fig. 5b 0.93 0.93 0.96
C Fig. 5c 0.94 0.93 0.95
N Fig. 5d 0.95 0.92 0.95
M Fig. 5e 0.96 0.96 0.98
S Fig. 5f 0.96 0.96 0.97
G=M Fig. 5g 0.99 0.99 0.99
CH o P I Fig. 5h 0.98 0.98 0.98
CH o P E Fig. 5i 0.98 – –
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First, consider B (Fig. 5a). Here, we observe that the inclusion of
3.000 records from members of a biobank improved the accuracy
by a reasonable margin (0.94 with no additional EMR records).
Moreover, the overall bound on the results including additional
records from the EMR has also improved to [0.93,0.95].
For the remainder of sites, we present a summary of the ﬁnd-
ings in Table 2. We see that, in general, accuracy increases as we
include more individuals from the biorepository. This increase is
shown in both the accuracy with no additional people and when
we add additional individuals from the EMR. The results of CH o P
mirror what was shown in [37]. That is, the biorepository contains
some bias which, when considered fully, decreases accuracy
slightly. We know, however, from that work that including the
entire EMR would compensate for this slight decline.Boston Children's Hospital GroupHealth Cincinnati Children's Hospital
Northwestern University Marshfield Clinic Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
Geisinger Clinic/Mayo Clinic
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia
Internal
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia
External
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(i)(g) (h)
Fig. 5. Results for all data sizes (rs1333049). Points left of the split are drawn from a biorepository. Points right of the split are drawn from the general EMR (without
members of the biorepository).
Table 3
Utility of 5-anonymized on data sets for SNPs across simulated populations.
Site SNP
rs2200733 rs2476601 rs3135388 rs6457620 rs17234657
r2 mL mR r2 mL mR r2 mL mR r2 mL mR r2 mL mR
B 0.9621 0.0189 0.0007 0.9230 0.0231 0.0004 0.9574 0.0089 0.0000 0.9423 0.0180 0.0005 0.9559 0.0219 0.0005
G 0.9349 0.0059 0.0009 0.9035 0.0113 0.0011 0.9477 0.0058 0.0010 0.9180 0.0107 0.0006 0.9204 0.0096 0.0023
CH o P (I) 0.9327 0.0059 0.0009 0.9057 0.0113 0.0011 0.9539 0.0058 0.0010 0.9340 0.0107 0.0006 0.9334 0.0096 0.0023
C 0.9349 0.0059 0.0002 0.9035 0.0113 0.0007 0.9477 0.0058 0.0012 0.9180 0.0107 0.0001 0.9204 0.0096 5.6485
N 0.9686 0.0079 0.0009 0.9464 0.0122 0.0013 0.9483 0.0050 0.0009 0.9489 0.0062 0.0004 0.9447 0.0062 0.0007
M 0.9774 0.0041 0.0019 0.9643 0.0075 0.0000 0.9488 0.0027 0.0001 0.9600 0.0045 0.0007 0.9454 0.0045 0.0009
S 0.9695 0.0037 0.0001 0.9813 0.0075 0.0004 0.9588 0.0019 0.0001 0.9497 0.0038 0.0003 0.9664 0.0042 0.0001
G=M 0.9695 0.0041 0.0008 0.9813 0.0073 0.0007 0.9588 0.0015 0.0031 0.9497 0.0046 0.0010 0.9664 0.0047 0.0014
CH o P (E) 0.9967 0.0041 NA 0.9958 0.0073 NA 0.9840 0.0015 NA 0.9971 0.0046 NA 0.9934 0.0047 NA
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To show how the demonstration SNP relates to the remaining
SNPs, we present results for the latter in Table 3. In general, we
see the same trend as was observed in the earlier example SNP.
B has an initial medium–high accuracy (r2 ¼ 0:9621), but we see
a decrease in accuracy with the next size set (G, r2 ¼ 0:9349). After
this, though, we generally see an increase in accuracy, all the way
up to the CH o P External data, (comparable in size to BioVU,
r2 ¼ 0:9967).
We observe that one dataset has a signiﬁcant negative mR, C for
rs17234657. This implies that the records chosen for larger data-
sets (which represents growth of the EMR without further growth
in the biorepository) have an extremely negative impact on the
post-anonymization accuracy. However, since this is by far the
worst result (all othermL andmR for all SNP > 0:0015) we believe
that this is an artifact of the randomized selection process.5. Discussion and conclusions
There are several important messages that have been shown in
these results that should be highlighted. First, the accuracy of asso-
ciation signiﬁcance does not necessarily increase through the addi-
tion of biorepository patients for the privacy protection of
individuals involved in a study. This is because there are many fac-
tors which may potentially affect this overall quality. The main
issue is that of an inherent selection bias within the biorepository,
which could present in several ways. For example, only individuals
with the same diagnosis code may have been recruited for the bio-
bank. Alternatively, a biobank can bias selection of included
patients towards those who visit an afﬁliated institution more fre-
quently. Even a completely random selection can introduce biases
of its own into the resulting data (e.g., rare codes are going to be
less represented in the biobank). While avoiding these biases
may prove difﬁcult, it is important to investigate the impact they
have upon the protection of data within the system in order to
determine whether a particular method is well-suited for
protection.
Second, the results further suggest that randomly selecting
records for protection from the overall EMR (even a fairly substan-
tial number when compared to the data to be released) is not suf-
ﬁcient to produce anonymized data with high utility. Instead, we
reafﬁrm the conclusion offered in [37]. An institution can both
release rich, useful data and protect the released records against
the entirety of their dataset by performing a full-scale anonymiza-
tion and releasing the needed, speciﬁc records. This, in general,
provides better results than by trying to determine a ‘‘sufﬁcient’’
number of records against which to protect the sample set.
Each simulated data set corresponded to a single randomized
selection from our EMR. This may add noise to the results atdifferent data points, which could be resolved with repeated
randomization. However, we note that since each dataset was ran-
domized independently, the trend observed across the points in
the scalability plots is expected to correspond to the mean result.
Our work suggests that institutions should use the data on
patients in their biobank (or the entire EMR population) to protect
the privacy of those involved in a speciﬁc study. However, future
work should test this method on additional datasets and report
on the usability of subsequent data. Given that this genome–
phenome associations frequently take the form of a pooled or
meta-analysis, there may even be issues with data protection when
the cohort is assembled across multiple, disjoint sites.
A second future direction is to consider the impact of time on
anonymized releases. For example, if a particular patient is
included in multiple study cohorts, it may be possible to track
the patient through composition attacks across institutions that
violate the principles of a k-type protection [56–58]. Despite such
limitations, the presented results provide strong evidence that
anonymization of EMR data can be accomplished with minimal
impact on association studies and that such approaches beneﬁt
when large populations can be drawn upon for protection.
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